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JOHN KERRY AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: WAR POWERS IN 
A KERRY ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
Ryan C. Hendrickson, Department of Political Science, Eastern  
Illinois University 1 
 
Not since the Vietnam era has the United States entered a presidential election 
year with the United States at such a heightened state of war. The ongoing combat in 
Iraq, the continued military efforts against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda supporters in 
Afghanistan, and the multiple covert operations deployed around the world to defeat 
terrorism are all indications of the “militarization” of American foreign policy, both now 
and in the foreseeable future. Whoever is elected in November 2004 will face these 
continued security challenges, as well the strategic threats from North Korea, Iran, and 
elsewhere. Clearly, the individual who assumes the position of commander in chief for 
the next four years will face critical decisions in protecting the United States.  
After nearly one full term with George W. Bush as commander in chief, his views 
on constitutional war powers have been expressed on numerous occasions. Despite the 
array of scholars who point to Congress’s constitutionally protected war powers, 
President Bush, like his post World War II predecessors, has exercised and claimed 
wide military authority as commander in chief. Many observers have raised concerns 
about the ostensible growth in the president’s asserted powers while conducting the war 
                                            
1 The author wishes to thank Tom Ethridge for his research assistance, and for the useful comments received during the review 
process.  
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on terrorism, as well with Bush’s essentially unilateral claims of military authority in the 
months prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.2  
Unlike many previous presidential elections, in the 2004 election cycle, foreign 
policy issues have been at the forefront of the American policy agenda. The Democratic 
party’s nominee for president, Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) has nearly twenty years 
experience in the United States Congress, and has interacted with four commanders in 
chief. These presidents have conducted multiple and varied military operations. During 
his tenure in the Senate, Kerry has a long record on war powers, which potentially 
provides some insight on how he might interact with Congress on military matters if 
elected president. This paper provides a broad examination of Kerry’s views on war 
powers, including analysis of his positions on Congress’s war powers during the 
Vietnam War (including the War Powers Resolution), his reactions to Presidents Ronald 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush’s military strikes abroad, his views on President Bill 
Clinton’s multiple military actions, and Kerry’s positions on war powers with George W. 
Bush as commander in chief. The findings suggest that his rhetorical support for 
Congress’s constitutional war powers has often not matched his de facto backing of 
unilateral military actions by the president. If elected president, it is unlikely that Kerry’s 
relationship with Congress would be markedly different from President Bush’s, and thus 
it seems probable that the United States will continue the practice of a “strong” [if not 
omnipotent] commander in chief vis-à-vis the Congress. 
 
                                            
2 Nancy Kassop, “The War Power and Its Limits,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 33, 3 (2003): 509-529; G. Calvin Mackenzie, 
“Old Wars, New Wars, and the American Presidency,” in George C. Edwards III and Philip John Davies eds. New Challenges for 
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Vietnam and the War Powers Resolution  
John Kerry first gained national attention as an articulate and outspoken critic of 
the United States military presence in Vietnam. As a decorated veteran, Kerry became 
a vocal opponent to the war.3 In 1971, Kerry was invited to testify at a meeting of the 
Senate Foreign Relations committee, chaired at the time by Senator J. William Fulbright 
(D-Ark.). In his recorded testimony and in an appeal to end American participation in the 
war, Kerry advanced a number of basic constitutional principles on war powers. He 
noted:  
We are asking here in Washington for some action, action from the Congress of 
the United States of America which has the power to raise and maintain armies, 
and which by the Constitution also has the power to declare war.4  
 
In the statement, Kerry clearly referenced Congress’s explicit war powers, and called for 
Congress to exercise those powers.  
This statement squares with the Constitution, which endowed Congress with a 
host of military powers, including the power to provide for the common defense; To 
grant letters of Marque and Reprisals; To raise and support Armies; To provide and 
maintain a Navy; and To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the 
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.5 In James Madison’s notes on the 
Constitutional Convention, Madison added that it was understood by the founding 
fathers that the president would have unilateral authority only to “repel sudden attacks” 
                                                                                                                                             
the American Presidency (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2004); Donald R. Wolfensberger, “The Return of the Imperial 
Presidency?” Wilson Quarterly (Spring, 2002): 36-41.  
3  Kerry earned the Silver Star, the Bronze Star, and was awarded three Purple Hearts for his military activities in Vietnam.  
4 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “Legislative Proposals Relating to the War in Southeast Asia,” (April 
22, 1971).  
5 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8. 
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against the United States.6 A president was enabled to defend the United States, but 
otherwise needed congressional approval before initiating military action. Such views 
were similarly expressed as the founders reached out to the states when the ratification 
process was underway, and later was affirmed in early U.S. Supreme Court decisions.7 
Thus, when Kerry appealed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971, his 
petition reached back to the earliest constitutional principles on Congress’s war powers.  
During the cold war, however, many Americans rallied behind presidents in their 
military actions against communism. The Congress responded by granting wide 
discretionary military authority to the commander in chief in order to defeat communism, 
or simply deferred to presidential military endeavors when fighting communism. 
Presidents began to assert essentially unilateral powers as commander in chief, much 
greater than was witnessed in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries.8   
U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the 20th century, most notably, United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright (1936), also contributed to this growth in foreign policy powers for the 
president. In writing the Court’s majority opinion, Justice George Sutherland maintained 
that the president is the “sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations.” He added that the president had “plenary and exclusive” powers 
in the area of foreign policy.9 Although the decision has been widely criticized in the 
years that followed, American courts have nonetheless often referenced this decision 
                                            
6 James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (1966; reprint New York: W.W. Norton, 1987): 476. 
7 See Charles A. Lofgren, “War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,” Yale Law Journal 81 (1972) and 
David Gray Adler, “The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate,” Political Science Quarterly 103, 1 
(1988): 1-36.  
8 The best historical account on Congress’s war powers during the 19th century can be found in Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin 
B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law 2nd ed.  (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 1989).  
9  United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
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when justifying presidential leadership in foreign policy.10 In light of these judicial trends 
and the cold war norm of deferring to the president, Kerry’s views on war powers were 
somewhat unorthodox for the era. However, his references to Congress’s war powers in 
1971 were constitutionally well-grounded.  
Another indication of Kerry’s rhetorical backing of Congress’s war powers is his 
long-standing support of the War Powers Resolution (WPR), which was passed in 1973, 
over Richard M. Nixon’s veto during the Vietnam War. Through this resolution, the 
Congress attempted to reassert Congress’s war powers. In stating its purpose, the 
WPR notes:  
To fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and 
insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will 
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Force into hostilities, or into 
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances…11 
 
Among the requirements placed upon the president, the resolution demands that  
“The President in every possible circumstance shall consult with Congress before 
introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and 
after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until 
United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been 
removed from such conditions.”12  
 
Although many critics have noted its legitimate flaws, including Congress’s 
unwillingness to exercise the WPR and all presidents’ refusal to accept the resolution’s 
                                            
10  Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973): 100-104; Louis Fisher, 
Presidential War Power (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995): 57-61; David Gray Adler, “Court, Constitution, and 
Foreign Affairs,” in David Gray Adler, ed. The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1996): 45.  
11 P.L. 93-148, Sec. 2.(a).  
12  Ibid at Sec. 3.  
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constitutionality, its intent was to restore a balance between Congress and the president 
over use-of-force decisions. 13 Congress did not want to experience again anything 
similar to Vietnam, when many felt that the presidency had become imperial and 
beyond checking.14 
Although less is recorded about Kerry’s specific views on the WPR at the time of 
its passage, during his Senate career he has frequently recalled his support for the 
resolution. In 1986, upon the death of former Senator Jacob Javits (D-N.Y.), who was 
the WPR’s principal author, Kerry specifically lauded Javits’ “intellectual and substantive 
contribution to the issues of war and peace…” and for “playing a constructive and 
positive role on issues of war and peace.”15 In 1990, he also stated, “I am a strong 
supporter and advocate of the War Powers Resolution.”16 Kerry expressed similar views 
on the WPR in 1994.17 Thus, on a number of occasions, unlike other members of 
Congress who have openly opposed the WPR, Kerry has consistently stated his 
adamant support for the Resolution.18 From this perspective, one may conclude that 
Kerry has been a vigorous champion of Congress’s constitutional war powers and the 
WPR. Much of the evidence, however, suggests otherwise.  
                                            
13 For critical views on the War Powers Resolution, see Timothy S. Boylan and Glenn A. Phelps, “The War Powers Resolution: A 
Rationale for Congressional Inaction,” Parameters 31, 1 (2001): 109-124; David Gray Adler and Louis Fisher, The War Powers 
Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye,” Political Science Quarterly 113, 1 (1998): 1-20; Michael J. Glennon, “Too Far Apart: The War 
Powers Resolution,” University of Miami Law Review 50, 17 (1995): 17-31; Edward Keynes, “The War Powers Resolution: A Bad 
Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone,” The University of Toledo Law Review 23 (1992): 343-362; Robert A. Katzman, “War 
Powers: Toward a New Accommodation,” in Thomas A. Mann ed. A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress, and 
Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution, 1990): 35-69.  
14 The hypocrisy of Congress’s own view that it could do nothing to reign in the president is well documented in John Hart Ely, 
War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).  
15 Congressional Record (March 18, 1986): 5130.  
16 Congressional Record (October 2, 1990): S 14332.  
17 Congressional Record (September 14, 1994): 24616.  
18 For more on Congress’s opposition to the WPR, see Ryan C. Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress 
and War Powers (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002).   
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Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush Military Actions  
During John Kerry’s time as a U.S. Senator, both Presidents Ronald Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush carried out a number of military actions in which Congress had 
limited, if any input on use-of-force decisions for the United States. Kerry was elected as 
the junior Senator for Massachusetts in 1984. As a Senator, President Reagan was the 
first commander in chief he was required to check and balance. 
Prior to Kerry’s election in 1983, President Reagan deployed American troops in 
cooperation with a number of Caribbean states to Grenada. The troop number reached 
approximately 8,000. The invasion was trigged by the assassination of Grenadine 
leader Maurice Bishop, who had achieved power through a coup d’etat in 1979. Bishop 
had been friendly with Cuba and the Soviet Union, but the rebel challenger, Bernard 
Coard, expressed much more sympathetic views toward the communist allies, as well 
as anti-American rhetoric. The American troop deployment also matched closely with 
the Reagan’s administration’s desire to “roll back” communism. Moreover, when the 
invasion occurred, Reagan officials also maintained that American medical students 
attending St. George’s Medical College were threatened by Coard’s rebellion, although 
considerable doubt has been expressed regarding how threatened the students really 
were during the rebellion.19  
According to key Reagan administration officials, Congress had no role in the 
decision to use force. Former Secretary of State George Shultz wrote that the Reagan 
                                            
19  David P. Forsythe, The Politics of International Law: U.S. Foreign Policy Reconsidered (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1990): 63-88.  
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Fall 2004, Vol. 7, Issue 1 8
 foreign policy principals made the decision to strike, upon which Shultz then asked his 
staff to call congressional leaders to the White House to inform them of the forthcoming 
military action.20 As noted above, the degree to which Grenada represented an 
emergency and national security threat to the United States has been doubted by 
analysts. Moreover, 18 Americans were killed in the operation, and thus by definition 
U.S. troops faced hostilities as implied by the WPR. Key congressional leaders were 
notified about the forthcoming strike, but the decision to use force was made prior to 
any actual meeting with Congress, which represents a clear violation of the WPR, and 
from a constitutional perspective, involved no “balancing” role from Congress.21 
Although Kerry was not in office at the time, in 1993 he noted his support for President 
Reagan’s military action in Grenada.22 Kerry’s support for Reagan is striking considering 
such an egregious violation of the WPR, when coupled with Kerry’s previously stated 
views on the WPR and Congress’s war powers.   
 In 1986, in the first major military action by an American president in Kerry’s first 
Senate term, the Reagan administration conducted air strikes on Libyan leader 
Muammar Qaddafi. According to Reagan, the Libyan government was directly 
responsible for a terrorist strike on a German dance club frequented by American 
servicemen and women. One U.S. soldier and sixty other Americans were wounded in 
the terrorist attack, as well as over 100 Germans.23 
                                            
20 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993): 334-5.  
21 Michael Rubner, “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada,” Political 
Science Quarterly 100 (1985-1986): 627-647. 
22 Congressional Record, (October 7, 1993): 23933.  
23  Ronald Reagan, “Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Sneate of the 
United States on the United States Air Strike Against Libya,” Public Papers of the Presidents (April 6, 1986): 478.  
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As with Grenada, Congress had no decision-making role in the strikes. Members 
of Congress who received prior notification of the forthcoming strikes admitted that they 
had no voice in the military decision and that they had no real ability to shape the actual 
decision. Reagan administration officials notified Congressional leaders three hours 
before the actual military strikes on Qaddafi.24 At the time, Senator Kerry, like most 
members of Congress, expressed no constitutional qualms with President Reagan’s 
actions in the Congressional Record. Ironically, the strikes on Qaddafi came less than 
one month after Kerry had lauded Senator Javits’ career and the WPR.   
As with the strikes on Grenada and Libya, Kerry also supported President 
George H. W. Bush in 1989 when Bush used 10,000 American troops to capture 
Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega in “Operation Just Cause.” Following the pattern 
established by Reagan, Bush informed congressional leaders of the forthcoming strikes 
only a few hours in advance. Four years later, in 1993, Kerry noted that “we made the 
right decision when we went into Grenada and into Panama, even though we knew 
casualties were a possibility.”25 In effect, Kerry again supported a decision by the 
president, which relegated Congress to a non-player in the actual decision to strike—
even though he ostensibly understood that American hostilities were expected.26  
With the war on drugs high on the political agenda in the first year of the Bush 
administration, before the American invasion of Panana, Kerry also pushed President 
Bush to think more broadly about multilateral means to fight the war on drugs. In doing 
                                            
24 Pat Towell, “After the Raid on Libya, New Questions on the Hill,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly (April 19, 1986): 839.  
25 Congressional Record, (October 7, 1993): 23933.  
26  Kerry had voted for a “Sense of the Senate” resolution on October 5, 1989, which encouraged President Bush to restore the 
constitutional government in Panama, but such a resolution is not equivalent to a declaration of war, and does not have legally 
binding status. See Congressional Record (October 5, 1989): S 12690.  
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so, Kerry encouraged Bush to consider the creation of a multilateral drug strike-force, 
which would work in partnership with Caribbean states.27 Kerry was not specific in how 
the strike-force would operate, and what the United States’ role in such an organization 
would be. Whatever its makeup, however, it is difficult to envision a substantive role for 
Congress when military decisions would be required. Such an organization would 
ostensibly be involved in air and maritime patrols and would require expeditious 
decisions from its participants. Although many Americans supported the United States’ 
efforts to address the growing drug problem, Kerry’s proposal would have led to 
additional empowerment of the executive branch in military matters.  
 When Congress was faced with the decision to go to war to liberate Kuwait from 
Saddam Hussein’s military occupation in 1991, Kerry voted against the use of force. 
When casting his vote, Kerry spoke about the need for Congress to stand up and 
oppose this military action.28 By taking this position, Kerry exercised his constitutional 
powers to check the president, and through his opposition clearly cannot be accused of 
complete deference to the president. In the hours that followed the ensuing military 
strikes, however, Kerry quickly rallied behind President Bush, noting that we should 
“support the troops,” and that the troops should “not have the rug pulled out underneath 
them, that they not somehow wind up with second guessing which then puts them at 
greater peril.”29 It is certainly admirable that Kerry openly backed American forces in 
combat and wished no harm on them during this moment of crisis. At the same time, his 
statements imply that it would no longer be right to challenge the president’s decision, 
                                            
27  Congressional Record (September 6, 1989): 19572-3.  
28 Congressional Record (January 12, 1991): 1011.  
29 Congressional Record (January 17, 1991): 1829.  
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and that any “checking” of the president would be inappropriate during the actual 
combat. Such views were not held by Senators Fulbright and Javits, nor by Kerry nearly 
twenty years before when he testified in front of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, and when he specifically noted Congress’s war powers in 1971. 
In addition, upon the American military victory against Iraq in 1991, 
approximately two months after the initial strikes, Kerry stated on the Senate floor that 
he had voted to support military action against Iraq if necessary on August 2, 1990. 
Kerry emphasized that Democrats and the Republicans, who voted against the use of 
force in January 1991, had “immediately rallied around the country and troops and gave 
full support to our military effort.”30 Kerry’s statement again suggests that his 
constitutionally protected right to check the president was not going to extend to a time 
period when American troops were in combat. No “balancing” would take place during 
war.  
In sum, in his first eight years in the United States Senate, serving alongside two 
presidents who conducted a host of military actions, Kerry generally supported the 
practice of having a strong commander in chief, who essentially went unchecked by the 
Congress. The one exception was his vote in 1991 against Operation Desert Storm. 
Otherwise, Kerry supported both presidents and their broadly perceived military powers 
in situations when the United States faced no imminent threat and U.S. troops were 
engaged in combat. Kerry’s record on the War Powers Resolution, like most members 
of Congress, represents almost a complete abdication to the commander in chief. 
Moreover, it should be noted that Kerry did not try to distinguish between “war” and 
                                            
30 Congressional Record (March 13, 1991): 5925.  
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military operations short of war, which some members of Congress have used to justify 
their deference to the commander in chief. The operations in Grenada and Panama 
were not “limited” strikes, and involved thousands of U.S. ground troops, who engaged 
in combat and experienced casualties. While the operations were different from Iraq in 
1991, a semantical debate over whether these operations were actually “war” misleads 
from the central point, that Congress was not involved in the combat decisions, which 
Kerry supported.  
 
Bill Clinton’s Military Actions 
Bill Clinton used force in a number of military operations during his presidency. 
Kerry did not always go to the Senate floor with opinions on the constitutionality of  
Clinton’s actions, but from Kerry’s recorded responses a clear trend in his views can be 
established.  In each case of Clinton’s military operations, Kerry supported military 
action. In some cases, despite his previous support for the War Powers Resolution, 
Kerry took steps to ensure that Clinton would not be checked by the Congress prior to 
forthcoming military action.  
 In October 1993, after President Clinton’s first major military crisis in Somalia, a 
number of Senate Republicans, led by Senator Don Nickles (R-Ok.), proposed an 
amendment to require Congressional approval prior to American troop involvement in 
U.N. sponsored operations. While the partisan rhetoric appeared high at the time, 
Nickles’ proposal squared with the legislative history of the United Nations Participation 
Act in 1945, which maintained that U.S. troops could not participate in U.N. sponsored 
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Fall 2004, Vol. 7, Issue 1 13
military operations without congressional approval.31 Kerry responded to these GOP 
efforts by defending presidential freedom of action in a manner that provided wide 
discretion to the president. He noted:  
When you look hard at the Nickles amendment, it is clear that it does not deal 
with the problem before us, but it is probably unconstitutional on its face, since it 
purports to take away the power of the Commander in Chief as a commander in chief 
who has the right to order troops to fight in certain ways at certain times with certain 
people. 32 
Although Kerry had previously noted his support for Congress’s war powers, 
based upon this statement it is difficult to determine under what conditions Congress 
could limit presidential military ambitions.  
Similarly, Kerry went to great lengths to protect President Clinton prior to the 
deployment of 10,000 American troops to Haiti to restore President Jean Bertrand 
Aristide to power. Although the deployment was conducted after a negotiated 
settlement, it seemed reasonable to conclude at the time that American troops would 
potentially face “hostilities” as specified by the WPR. American troops stepped onto 
Haitian soil armed and ready for combat, even though it was clear that Clinton was not 
acting to “repel a sudden attack” against the United States. Prior to the deployment, 
many Senate Republicans favored a vote on President Clinton’s authority to use troops 
abroad in this operation, but senior Democrats, led by Majority Leader George Mitchell 
                                            
31 Louis Fisher, “The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act,” American Journal of International Law 89 (1995): 26-
27; Michael J. Glennon, “The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,” American Journal of International Law 
85 (1991): 74-88; Matthew D. Berger, “Implementing a United Nations Security Council Resolution: The President’s Power to 
Use Force with the Authorization of Congress,” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 15 (1991): 83-109; and 
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(D-Me.) prohibited a vote from occurring.33 In siding with the senior Democrats, Kerry 
stated, “I would prefer to have a vote. It is consistent with everything I have ever said 
since I fought in Vietnam.” Yet, Kerry also defended Clinton’s authority to deploy the 
troops, noting that the president sometimes faces “the lonely decision” as commander in 
chief, and that “there are times when the buck stops at the desk of the President of the 
United States who has to make a decision.”34  
Again, it is difficult to reconcile Kerry’s previously stated views and ostensible 
support for the WPR and Congress’s war powers with his justification for such wide 
powers for the commander in chief. In President Clinton’s military actions through NATO 
in Bosnia and Kosovo, Kerry similarly backed the president and the use of force.35 In 
each case, Congress took no binding decision on military action against the president 
prior to the strikes, even though it was clear to most observers that military action was 
forthcoming in the immediate days prior to the strike.  
 On Clinton’s multiple military strikes against Iraq, it is difficult to find a more 
ardent supporter of military action against Saddam Hussein and presidential war powers 
than Kerry. In September 1996, when President Clinton employed 43 cruise missiles on 
Iraq in response to Hussein’s strikes against Iranian-backed Kurdish resistance forces 
in northern Iraq, no member of Congress was consulted prior to the strike.36 Kerry 
expressed no constitutional qualms or concerns about violations of the WPR, and rather 
                                                                                                                                             
Michael J. Glennon, “United States Mutual Security Treaties: The Commitment Myth,” Columbia Journal of of Transnational Law 
24 (1986): 530-532. 
32 Congressional Record (October 19, 1993): 25243 
33 Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars, 67.  
34 Congressional Record (September 14, 1994): 24615-6.  
35 Congressional Record (February 9, 1994): 1780; Congressional Record (March 23, 1999): S3110.  
36 Congressional Record (September 5, 1996): H 10095; Adrianne Flynne, “GOP Senators Displeased at Being in the Dark on 
Iraq,” Arizona Republic (September 6, 1996): A13.   
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argued, “President Clinton’s response to Saddam’s latest challenge was the right one—
decisive, measured, and carefully calculated to take the strategic advantage away from 
Saddam.”37 In February 1998, when Clinton faced another crisis over Iraqi compliance 
with the United Nations Weapons Inspectors, Kerry suggested that he was ready to use 
ground troops if necessary, and also noted that a strategic bombing would not likely be 
sufficient to deal with Saddam since it would not remove the root cause of the 
compliance problem.38 Kerry also raised no constitutional objections to Operation Desert 
Fox, the four-day military operation against Hussein in December 1998, nor did he 
challenge the president’s authority to use force against Iraq for violations of the 
American-imposed no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. Approximately 130 
different strikes were conducted after Operation Desert Fox. Although President Clinton 
as well as many members of Congress claimed that Congress had actually authorized 
such military action in 1991, these claims suggest a rather broad interpretation of 
Congress’s vote in 1991.39  
 Kerry’s choices and public positions on war powers on many of Clinton’s military 
actions were like most members of Congress, who rarely questioned Clinton’s 
proclaimed authority to use force.40 What makes Kerry stand out among members of 
Congress, however, is the degree to which he defended Clinton’s perceived powers as 
commander in chief, especially in Clinton’s military operations conducted with U.N. 
approval. It is difficult to reconcile such views, however, with Kerry’s previously stated 
                                            
37 Congressional Record, (September 5, 1996): S9937.  
38 ABC This Week (February 22, 1998), transcript number 98022203-j12.  
39 See Louis Fisher, “Military Action Against Iraq,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 28, 4 (1998).  
40 Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars, especially chapter seven.  
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support for the WPR and his other comments suggesting the importance of 
congressional war powers.  
 
George W. Bush’s Military Actions 
George W. Bush’s two major military endeavors since taking office have been in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, Congress was closely involved in writing the 
resolution language that authorized the eventual military action. Kerry’s largest decision-
making role during the Bush administration occurred after September 11, 2001, when 
Bush turned to Congress to seek its approval for military action to defeat terrorism.  
 When S.J.Res 23 came to the Senate floor on September 14, 2001, it was clear 
that negotiations and compromise had taken place between the White House and 
Congress. Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) noted that the president had initially 
requested unlimited spending powers in conducting the global war on terrorism: the 
Congress did not allow this executive request.41 Senator Levin (D-Mi.) added that the 
key negotiators had demanded that some reference be made to the War Powers 
Resolution, which was included in the final resolution.42 Bush officials also initially 
sought military authority to strike pre-emptively against terrorists, which Congress 
opposed. Instead, congressional negotiators permitted the president to “prevent” acts of 
terrorism.43 In this respect, Congress clearly played some checking role toward the 
president, and Senator Kerry was a key participant in this process. The Congress 
                                            
41 Congressional Record (September 14, 2001): S9424.  
42  Congressional Record (September 14, 2001): S9416.  
43 Congressional Record (September 14, 2001): S9423.  
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turned back requests that would have grossly expanded presidential powers, and in 
some respect, reigned in the president.  
 At the same time, a legitimate argument can be made that a great deal of 
deference exists within the resolution itself. The key part of S.J. Res 23 reads:  
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such organizations or persons.44  
Such language permits extremely wide decision-making authority and military 
freedom in fighting the war on terrorism. Yet Senator Kerry noted about the resolution:  
“…it does not give the President a blanket approval to take military action against 
others under the guise of fighting international terrorism. It is not an open-ended 
authorization to use force in circumstances beyond those we face today.” 45 
 
Despite Kerry’s ostensibly genuine views on his interpretation of the resolution, it is 
difficult to see how Congress had actually limited the president, and what role, if any, 
Congress would play in the conduct of the war to come.46  
Moreover, additional evidence suggests that when the resolution was being negotiated, 
Senate Democrats broke from the House Democrats, who were demanding greater 
oversight, intelligence sharing and consultation before military action would have been 
allowed. Differences still remained between the White House and the Democratic 
negotiators on September 13 when both sides parted. Yet, the following day, Senate 
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Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) allowed the resolution to move forward in its 
current form to the Senate floor, where it passed unanimously. Clearly, the Senate 
favored a less involved role for the Congress in fighting terrorists.47  
 In short, while it is accurate to say that Congress played some checking role 
against the president initially, it also is fair to conclude that the Congress granted 
extremely wide discretion to the commander in chief in determining the conduct of the 
war on terrorism. Kerry was involved in the resolution language, and in this respect, 
must again be credited with granting wide authority to the commander in chief.  
 On Iraq, unlike nearly all previous military actions conducted during his Senate 
tenure, Kerry played an instrumental role in calling for Bush to gain congressional 
authorization prior to the actual use of force. In an op-ed article in the New York Times, 
Kerry wrote that Bush “must seek advice and approval from Congress” before moving 
forward with military action on Saddam Hussein.48 Despite Bush’s claims in August 2002 
of his existing authority to take military action against Iraq, the administration responded 
to Kerry and others’ requests to seek congressional approval. In this respect, Kerry and 
others effectively and publicly asserted their congressional war powers, which Bush 
eventually respected.   
 When the “Joint Resolution to Authorize Use of Military Force Against Iraq”  
eventually reached the Senate floor, which the Senate approved in a vote of 77-33, 
Kerry provided extensive remarks on the resolution. He noted that the Congress had 
amended the president’s originally proposed language, which included the request to 
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use military force across the Persian Gulf, but instead limited a military strike to Iraq. 
Kerry also noted that he had not voted for “regime change,” but only to exercise military 
options in order to force Hussein to comply with the weapons inspectors. He also noted 
that Congress had won a victory by requesting that the president attempt to work 
through the United Nations, rather than moving forward without regard for the United 
Nations. Unlike Kerry’s previous comments on American military action, however, he 
noted that “we will hold them [the administration] accountable for the means by which 
we do this…It is through constant questioning we will stay the course…”49 Once 
presidents initiate military operations, Kerry has tended to support the commander in 
chief regardless of his initial position taken, which is why this statement in 2002 stands 
out over the course of his career.  
 As it did after September 11, 2001, Congress had clearly checked the president, 
and reigned in the more wide-sweeping claims of presidential authority. Kerry was 
among the most public in calling for the president to gain congressional approval prior to 
the war, and he and others helped to steer an outline for American foreign policy prior to 
military action. At the same time, the resolution stilled granted wide authority to the 
commander in chief in determining whether or not force will be used. Section 3 (a) 
reads, “The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he 
determines to be necessary and appropriate…”50 Some analysts make a legitimate 
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argument when noting that Congress abdicated its war powers to the president in this 
resolution, leaving it to the commander in chief to make the final decision on war.51  
Senator Kerry later argued that he had been misled by the Bush administration, 
and that the resolution he voted for was not the policy that President Bush eventually 
adopted. Yet up until the war began, Kerry expressed no constitutional qualms with the 
president’s authority, and did not join 12 members of the House of Representatives who 
filed suit against President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts (ironically, Kerry’s home state) for 
ignoring Congress’ war powers authority prior to the actual combat began in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.52     
Thus, on Iraq, Kerry’s record is again mixed on the issue of war powers. He and 
others members of Congress were fierce defenders of congressional war powers when 
the Bush administration attempted to move toward military action in the summer of 2002 
without congressional approval. He also suggested, seemingly for the first time, that he 
would hold the president accountable during war if necessary, which is a view that he 
last articulated at length in 1971. In this respect, Kerry played a very public balancing 
role on war powers prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet he also voted for a resolution 
that gave quite wide military discretion to the commander in chief, and was not among 
those who presented legal challenges on the president’s authority to go to war.  
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Conclusion 
Over the course of his career in politics, John Kerry has established himself as 
both an outspoken supporter of congressional war powers, as well as a defender of 
unilateral presidential military action. Kerry has frequently and explicitly noted his 
support for the War Powers Resolution, and the important checking responsibility that 
Congress was granted by the Constitution. Most notably, Kerry exercised his war 
powers by voting against military action in Iraq in 1991, and later argued quite 
aggressively that President George W. Bush needed congressional approval before 
military strikes on Iraq. It also cannot be neglected that Kerry first gained national 
prominence by appearing before Congress in 1971, in requesting congressional action 
to end the American military presence in Vietnam.  
At the same time, Kerry also defended presidents when they used force abroad 
and rendered Congress a bystander in the decision-making process. Whether it was the 
strikes on Grenada, the invasion of Panama, or Clinton’s multiple strikes on Iraq, 
Congress had essentially no role in the decision to use force. Kerry never expressed 
any constitutional qualms with these military actions.  Kerry has been an especially 
strong proponent of presidential military action through multilateral organizations, 
despite the legislative history that protected Congress’s war powers authority. 
Moreover, despite his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
1971 during the Vietnam War, and through his comments prior to Iraqi Freedom about 
his intent to question the president as necessary, Kerry has otherwise rallied behind the 
president during war, essentially suggesting the inappropriateness of congressional 
opposition when American troops are in combat.  
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 As commander in chief, it seems likely that Kerry would fall in line with all 
previous post World War II presidents, who have claimed essentially unlimited powers 
in military matters. He has made many statements suggesting wide authority for the 
president as commander in chief. While Kerry has spoken often about the principle of 
Congress’s war powers and the legislature’s necessary checking responsibilities, most 
of his record favors a commander in chief who exercises wide military powers, 
especially when the United States operates with multilateral endorsement.  
At the same time, Kerry would have to take some additional measures to show 
respect for the War Powers Resolution, since he has so often noted his support of it. 
Kerry would be quite unique in this respect, in that all presidents since 1973 have 
publicly opposed the WPR. Given his recent public challenge to President Bush’s 
authority to wage war in Iraq, as President, Kerry would also be open to challenge as 
commander in chief, given the discrepant positions he has taken on the issue of war 
powers during his Senate career.  
 
